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Article 2

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 4, Number 1, Winter 1973

Some Observations About Products
Liability Litigation
James A. Dooley*
Products liability is almost a world unto itself. This effort will be
limited to some concepts of the pragmatic.
A decade ago when a farm hand who lost an arm in a combine consulted counsel, the immediate query of the lawyer would be: "Is there
a cause of action against the employer?" Today, the farm hand himself would ask: "Was the combine defective?" He well might be able
to point out those flaws in design which made it defective so as to be
unreasonably dangerous to the user. This is the era of the consumer.
The man on the street has an awareness of the liability of manufacturers and sellers for injuries caused by defective products.
PERSISTENCE OF OLD FORMs

Unfortunately, old forms persist. Courts and lawyers still cling to
negligence standards,' and the departure from the fictitious reasonable
* Loyola University (J.D.); Doctor of Laws Degree (Honorary) Clarke College;
Guest lecturer, Loyola University Law School; International Academy of Trial Law-

yers (Fellow, Director, 1954-President, 1960); American Trial Lawyers Association
(President, 1953-54); Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (President, 1951-55); Law
Science Academy (President, 1959-60); Recipient, Medal of Excellence, Loyola University School of Law, 1967.

1. The history of law is fraught with a reluctance to accident changes.

In 1939,

Congress amended the Federal Employer's Liability Act to abolish assumptions of risk

and bring within the Act all employees any part of whose work was in the furtherance

of interstate commerce. Yet it required a 1943 Supreme Court opinion, Bailey v.
Central Vermont, 315 U.S. 54, 64, to tell the courts that all cases under the Act were

to be handled as though the doctrine of assumption of risk never existed. It was not
until 1956, in the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. 493, that this 1939
amendment concerning interstate commerce was implemented, notwithstanding the
clear language of Congress.
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man of negligence law is not easily accomplished. Illustrative is the
Lunt case.2 There, the trial court, in enumerating the propositions the
plaintiff was required to prove, stated:
1. That the machine was unreasonably dangerous in that it created an unreasonable risk of harm to others, that is, that it failed
to guard against dangers reasonably to be foreseen, and was thus
defective;
The reviewing court reversed, since it injected the seller's conduct
into the case, stating:
We believe this portion of the instruction is prejudicially erroneous. It focuses on the conduct of the seller rather than on the
product...
Continuing, the Court observed:
The Restatement clearly makes the vendor liable although he
has "exercised all possible care in preparation and sale of his product." It does not matter that the seller has done "the best he can"
if the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous.
So also in a strict liability action against an automobile rental agency,
in which the plaintiff alleged that the brakes were defective, defendant
cross-examined plaintiff and introduced evidence concerning the speed
limit in the particular vicinity, notwithstanding that the vehicle was designed to stop at far higher speeds.'
In the doctrine of strict liability, the character of the product rather
4
than conduct is the prime issue.
As one court aptly observed:
In contradistinction to the law of negligence, the law of warranty
assigns liability on the basis of the product's lack of fitness. When
machinery "malfunctions," it obviously lacks fitness regardless of
the cause of the malfunction. Under the theory of warranty, the
"sin" is the lack of fitness as evidenced by the malfunction itself
rather than some specific dereliction by the manufacturer in constructing or designing the machinery.
2. Lunt v. Brady Manufacturing Corp., et al., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964,
65-66 (1970).
3. Knapp v. The Hertz Corporation, No. 63 C 29283, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois; Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 111. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305
(1970). (The original opinion in the Williams case ruled that contributory negligence
was a defense, but the court reversed itself on rehearing.)
4. We are cognizant that the affirmative defense of assumption of risk involves
the conduct of the plaintiff, Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d
305 (1970); that a few courts, such as New Hampshire, Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970), erroneously deal in terms of contributory
negligence as a defense; and that failure to warn may deal in terms of foreseeability,
a negligence standard. Anderson v. Klix Chemical Co., 256 Or. 199, 472 P.2d 806
(1970).
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As the substance of strict liability in tort is akin to that of the law
of warranty, the evidentiary requirements to establish breach of
warranty rather than those to prove
negligence should prevail in
5
an action in strict liability in tort.

But what of the deep-rooted confusion between contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Contributory negligence is not a defense
to an action in strict liability in tort, but assumption of risk may be
asserted.6 Each of these doctrines is entirely different. However, no
concepts in torts have been more commingled than contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
The two have wholly different meanings: 7
Where a person has knowledge of and fully appreciates a danger,
and under such circumstances, without any special exigency compelling him, he exposes himself to such danger or peril, his act in
the premises may be deemed to have been voluntary. Contributory negligence in such a case cannot properly be said to be an
element therein, for certainly the voluntary act of a party in exposing himself to a known and appreciated danger is wholly incompatible with an act of negligence or carelessness, for it must be
manifest that carelessness in regard to a matter is not the same as
the exercise of a deliberate choice in respect thereto. . . It is
evident that contributory negligence and incurring risk of a known
and appreciated danger are two independent and separate defenses, which should not be confused with each other.
And, as another court has stated:"
A clear distinction should be made between the doctrine of contributory negligence which operates as a defense when a party
knows or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known a
particular fact or circumstance, and assumption of risk, which operates only when the party actually knows the full scope and magnitude of the danger and thereafter voluntarily exposes himself to
it.
Probably, careless use of the two phrases by courts in negligence actions is responsible for the confusion.
5. Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130 I11.App. 2d 844, 851, 265 N.E.2d 212, 217
(1971).
6. Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, is representative of the
almost universal rule; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, SECOND, Sec. 402A, Comment n.
7. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. O'Brien, 160 Ind. 266, 65 N.E. 918, 920
(1903).
8. Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Anderson, 77 Nev. 68, 358 P.2d 892, 894 (1961).
See also Baldridge v. Wright Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 452, 96 N.E.2d 300 (1951); Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960); Skarpness v. Port of Seattle,
52 Wash. 2d 490, 326 P.2d 747 (1958). Annot., Distinction between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence, 82 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1962).
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In products cases, recognition of the difference between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk is vital to the implementation of strict
liability. Contributory negligence has an objective basis; it deals in
terms of the reasonable man. Assumption of risk is subjective. Did
the particular person know of the particular condition? That is the
query here. This is well summed up by the following instruction: 9
On that issue (assumption of risk) the jury was charged as follows:
Assumption of risk is walking into a dangerous situation with
your eyes open, not inadvertently and testing a known danger.
For example, in my view-and this of course is not binding on
you-but in this case, if Mr. Dorsey had consciously put his hand
into the machine, you might find that he assumed the risk.
But if you believe the testimony here that he put his hand on
the copper simply to feed it into the machine and then it was
picked up by a splinter and taken into the machine, I do not believe that you could find him guilty of assumption of risk, because
there is no evidence that he had consciously assumed the risk of
injury.
Nor does plaintiff assume the risk of injury involved in a defect unless
he realized its existence and voluntarily exposed himself to it.
Wherever the defense of assumption of risk is asserted, defendant
usually cross-examines plaintiff in great detail about his conduct as if
the issue were his due care. It would seem that before plaintiff's conduct could be inquired into on cross-examination, the defendant must
make a showing or a bona fide representation that there will be evidence of plaintiff's knowledge of the defect and his voluntary exposure
to it. We appreciate that the injured's denial of either his realization
or his voluntary conduct or both is not conclusive. 10 But, bearing in
mind that the test is a subjective one, there must be some evidence
creating at least a strong inference that he both realized the existence of
the defect and nonetheless voluntarily exposed himself to it.
It must be remembered that the risk of injury involved is the risk
from the defect," not the risk of the work itself. Plaintiff may be
working with a dangerous substance, such as anhydrous ammonia.
Nonetheless, he does not expose himself to the risk of being blinded
when a defective hose ruptures. In this illustrative situation, it would
be a particular error to allow cross-examination on such matters as:
(a) Whether he knew anhydrous ammonia was dangerous;
9.
10.
11.

Dorsey v. Yoder Company, 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
Elder v. Crawley Book Machinery Co., 441 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1971).
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Whether he was aware that if this substance contacted huan tissue, it would burn it; and
(c) Whether he knew that if he did not have his goggles on, he
could be blinded.
All of this would be immaterial unless there was a showing that he
knew of the defect in the hose and nonetheless assumed the danger of
that defect. Would it not seem the better course to require such a
showing rather than to attempt to handle the matter by a motion to
strike specific evidence-a procedure which would require repeating
the offensive matter?
While inadvertence or diversion of attention may be negligence, it is
not assumption of risk. This is classically illustrated by the Elder
case, 12 representative of an excellent comprehension of the doctrine.
Plaintiff was injured on a book binding machine. She turned the machine on, and in some manner, two of the fingers of her left hand
went into an opening, where they were severed. On cross-examination,
she stated she did not know how it happened. Here is what occurred:
Q. Mrs. Elder, will you concede that what happened was that
in a moment of carelessness and thoughtlessness, that you
put your fingers into a place where they were not supposed
to be, didn't you?
A. No, I wouldn't do that deliberately, stick my hand in there.
Q. Well, of course you didn't do it deliberately, but you did it
in a moment, a split-second of thoughtlessness and carelessness, didn't you?
A. No.
Q. Well, how did you do it? Why did you do it?
A. I don't know. It happened instantly.
Q. You did do it, didn't you?
A. It happened.
Plaintiff's judgment was affirmed on appeal since there was no assumption of risk as a matter of law. Negligence standards must be
avoided, particularly on the issue of the character of the product and
the injured's conduct.
(b)

REASONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY

The reasons for this doctrine have been repeated too often. Nonetheless, it is these reasons which make understandable evolutions in the
rules of evidence we shall later discuss. We all know they were first
12.

Id. at 773.
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expressed in Judge Traynor's famous specially concurring opinion in the
Escola case,'" the progenitor of the doctrine crystallized in Mr. Chief
Justice Traynor's Greenman decision.' 4 This justification is succinctly
stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts:
. . . the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the
public has the right to and does expect, in the case of a product
which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy
demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them,
and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and
the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products. 15
This paraphrases Holmes' thought "that the safest way to assure care
is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall
be taken."' 16
RECOGNITION OF THE POTENTIAL PRODUCTS ACTION

Today, each set of facts surrounding an injury or death should be
analyzed with these queries: Do they afford a potential products action? Is there evidence of defectiveness of some product? What about
its design? Was it such that a more adequate warning was required?
The duty of analysis is not confined to plaintiff's counsel. With
the growth of third party practice, the development between active
and passive wrongdoing, astute defense counsel will transfer the liability of his client to a third party, frequently the manufacturer or
seller. Often, such a third party action, although not resulting in a
complete transfer of responsibility, will provide a substantial contribution towards disposition of the principal action. It may be a source of
contribution making possible settlement.
Even of greater consequence is that products liability may be the
only possible common law action. This is particularly true of work
injuries, where the employee, be he laborer, tradesman or airplane pilot, is circumscribed by Workmen's Compensation Acts. On closer
13. Escola v. Coca Cola, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
14. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962).
15. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, SECOND, Sec. 402A, Comment c.
16. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW at 117 (1881).
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examination of the proximate causes-and there may be multiple
proximate causes-the equipment, tools or devices with which he
works is incriminated. It may be a hammer, 1 7 a nail,' s a grinding machine,' 9 or an altimeter."0
Probably, the classical case is that of the sewage treatment workers
who were injured and killed by asphyxiation in an effort to save a fellow worker whose gas mask failed to function. In the effort, one
ripped off his own mask, while the others entered the tunnel without
masks. All had an action against the manufacturer, with the rescue
doctrine being applied. 2 '
It is mandatory that when injury occurs without intervention of a
third party it be determined whether there is product involvement.
Consider the party riding in a leased vehicle which goes out of control
and strikes a stationary object or an innocent motorist. He may well
have an action if the defectiveness of the rented car is a cause of his
injury. The commercial lessor is in the same position as the retailer
and manfacturer in the conduct of commerce. So also is he in a far
22
better position than the consumer to know the character of the product.
Recognition of a potential action in strict liability in tort calls for an
awareness of the term "defect." This word has a singular sense; it is
far broader than its everyday meaning. It is not limited to a specific
condition. And there is no requisite that a specific defect be proved.
On the contrary, "defect" as used within this doctrine is both a generic
and elastic term.
As Mr. Justice Traynor has observed: "...
No single definition
of defect has proved adequate to define the scope of the manufacturer's
strict liability in tort for physical injuries."' 21 An excellent compen24
dium is found in an Illinois decision of Mr. Justice Schaefer:
Although the definitions of the term "defect" in the context of
products liability law use varying language, all of them rest upon
17. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401
(1969).
18. Sweeney v. Matthews, 46 111. 2d 64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970).
19. Taylor v. The Carborundum Co., 107 III. App. 2d 12, 246 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
20. Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
21. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 306 N.Y.2d 943, 255 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
22. Bockner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Ala. 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 85 Cal.
Rptr. 178, 466 P.2d 722 (1970); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corporation, 470 P.2d
240 (Hawaii 1970); Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service Co., 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965).
23. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1965).
24. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.
2d 339, 432, 343, 247 N.E.2d
401 (1969).
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the common premise that those products are defective which are
dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner reasonably
to be expected in light of their nature and intended function. So,
Chief Justice Traynor has suggested that a product is defective if
it fails to match the average quality of like products. (Traynor,
"The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability," 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).) The Restatement emphasizes the viewpoint of the consumer and concludes that a defect is a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer
which would be unreasonably dangerous to him. (RESTATEMENT
TORTS (SECOND) § 402A, comment g.) Dean Prosser has said that
"the product is to be regarded as defective if it is not safe for
such a use that can be expected to be made of it, and no warning
is given." (Prosser, "The Fall of the Citadel," 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 826.)
The doctrine embraces defects in design. A design which makes
the product unreasonably dangerous is defective. 2 If the product is
unreasonably dangerous as the result of its design, an action under this
theory is recognized.
Wherever there is a problem of showing that the product was in the
same condition at the time of injury as at the time it left the maker's
possession, it is particularly important to determine whether its design
made it dangerous. The design can be shown by the defendant's records. These may be blueprints and various literature, including brochures, and photographs. They make possible identification of the
product as defendant's, demonstrate its defectiveness, and dissipate any
contention of change in its condition.
Defectiveness may result from a failure to warn. A product may
be defective if it is unreasonably dangerous without adequate warning.
An excellent illustration is the Crane case. 26 A surface preparer was
sold by Sears and manufactured by a co-defendant. The label warned
it was an inflammable mixture, not to be used near fire nor flame.
The plaintiff, while working with the preparer, became enveloped in
flames. The defense's position was that the cause of the fire came
from a water heater six feet away from the plaintiff. She had a cause
of action, in that the labeling, while cautioning about the inflammable
character of the preparer, did not state that it was combustible or explosive.
25.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962);

Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Wright v. MasseyHarris, Inc., 68 Il. App. 2d 70, 217 N.E.2d 465 (1966); Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965).

26. Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754
(1963).
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To what products does the doctrine apply? Dean Prosser states:
"All types of products are obviously to be included."2 Sometimes the
line of demarcation between service and product, or method of installation and product may be narrow. In a rather unique situation, the
injured supervisory employee in a moment of distraction entered a target room where a linear electronic accelerator-a volatile source of radiation-was in action. It was possible for him to make the entry
while the accelerator was on since the area was not protected by a
door whose opening would break the circuit and shut down the machine. There was no doubt of the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The only avenue upon which to proceed was that the device was unreasonably dangerous without the circuit breaker.2 8 But what was it
-the product or its mode of installation-which made possible this
terrible occurrence?
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRODUCT ITSELF

There are many cogent reasons for the product's presence at trial.
Probably the least important is whether it is necessary to maintain
the action.
Yet in a case against General Motors, 9 no action could be maintained without the presence of the allegedly defective tire. This rule
fortunately has not been followed in subsequent cases in the same
court.3" The requirement is obviously too harsh since the offending
product may have been destroyed. It may never have been in the
custody of the injured, such as an infant burned through a defective
incubator in a hospital. Countless other situations making impossible
the product's presence can be conjured up.
It would seem ample proof of its character could be shown by its
age, its pre-accident use, its pre-accident appearance, the nature of the
occurrence, and its post-occurrence condition. Whatever evidence possible could be wrapped up in a hypothetical question, and the opinion
of an expert obtained.
One excellent opinion discusses almost all the contingencies under
which problems of proof might arise concerning the defective product,
with or without its presence. These are:
27. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN.
L. REV. 791, 805 (1966).

28. Carpenter v. Electronized Chem. Co., Circuit Court of Cook County, Case
No. 66
29.
30.
(1969)
(1970)

L 16371, handled for the plaintiff by the writer.
Shramek v. General Motors Corp., 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244 (1966).
Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 111. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584
(a defective plank); Nolan v. Shaff, 128 Ill. App. 2d 19, 261 N.E.2d 209
(defective ladder).
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(a)

The opinion of an expert based upon an examination of the
product is the usual method.
(b) Where the product is not available, the opinion of the expert
is based on a hypothetical question.
(c) Where there are no eyewitnesses and the product is destroyed,
proof of the occurrence itself and the particular probabilities
may be adequate.
(d) The probabilities of the defect, plus the snegating causes not
attributable to the defendant, may suffice. '
To the Stewart catalog, two additional categories could be added:
(a) The unavailable defectively designed product.
(b) The product defective because of failure to warn but unavailable.
As we have noted, proof of the defect in design can be made from
defendant's records, including drawings, blueprints, and other relevant
documents. These would be adequate foundation for a qualified expert to describe the details of its defectiveness.
Where the issue is failure to warn, we again find defendant's own
documents the best source. The label on the product, the accompanying instructions, together with the composition of the product are
significant. With the aid of an expert, all that is possible will be presented.
The product itself may demonstrate its defectiveness-a compelling
reason for its availability. Consider a can explosion case.3 2 In the
explosion, the cap of the can remained on, but the body seam split
open. This demonstrated the pressure was adequate to split the seam
of the body but inadequate to blow off the cap. This was the safety
valve. Had it blown off, no explosion would have occurred.
In a recent tire case, 33 the product was the best proof of its harm.
"The four-ply rayon tubeless tire here involved was available for examination by the various expert witnesses at the trial. The blowout or
31. "If an accident sufficiently destroys the product, or the crucial parts, then an
expert's opinion on the probabilities that a defect caused the accident would be helpful.
If no such opinion is possible, as in the present case, the user's testimony on what
happened is another method of proving that the product was defective. If the user is
unable to testify, as where the accident killed him or incapacitated him, no other witness was present at the time of the accident, and the product was destroyed, the fact
of the accident and the probabilities are all that remain for the party seeking recovery.
At this point the plaintiff can attempt to negate the user as the cause and further negate other causes not attributable to the defendant. These kinds of proof introduced
alone or cumulatively are evidence which help establish the presence of a defect as the
cause of the damage." Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corporation, 470 P.2d 240, 243,
244 (Hawaii 1970).
32. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 646, aff'd 46 Ill.
2d
288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
33. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306,
312 (1968).
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rupture on the tire occurred on the side away from the road so that
the user would not have been aware of any insipient damage unless he
had been under the car a short time before the tire failure occurred.
There was a definite crack in the innerliner which allowed air to escape
into the outer ply. It created a bubble in the outermost ply that grew
large and burst." In an earlier ladder case,3 4 the Court said "...
plaintiff's evidence on the subject of defectiveness was a ladder itself
and the circumstances under which it was used."
Probably the most important reason for the presence of the product
is for examination by an expert, who plays such an important part in
products litigation. Hence, the importance of an outstanding man.
He must be knowledgeable in this particular area of his specialty. Remember, the deeper that knowledge, the greater the ability to ascertain
deviations from the normal, and to know the significant from the
meaningless. More than that, however, he should be entirely familiar
with all means available to expose the particular defect. Photographic
techniques, with magnifying lens, offer an invaluable aid in showing
up the flaws and weaknesses in the product.3 5
Drawings and charts illustrating the normal and the want of it in
the particular product are but a few of the almost limitless methods
available. These are as broad and deep as knowledgeable imagination. Be certain that the expert knows that his job is to convey the
meaning of the defect he has found through the most simple avenue
of communication. This will frequently stir him to demonstrative methods.
Of course, your adversary is always aware of the importance of the
examination of the product by his expert. His client wants to know:
(a) if it is its product; (b) if it is defective; and (c) if any defect
is attributable to it or to misuse or abuse. The opposition always
knows far more about its product than you do. While your adversary
has a right to examine and to perform certain tests, it cannot do anything which will in anywise change the character of the object. Character means every characteristic which makes it what it is. To insure
preservation of the product, have it photographed before it is given
the opposition.
34. Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 829, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143,
146 (1966).

35. Under magnification, the interior of an exploding can was not uniformly

rusted.

There were shiny surfaces rust free, particularly where the can would be

crimped at the seam. This indicated the existence of the rust before the explosion, as
that part was folded over and not subject to corrosive action. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.,
116 111. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636, afj'd 46 111. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1963).
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The order of the proposed examination by the adversary should,
whenever possible, include:
(a) A detailed description of the testing, specifying the limitations imposed by the court;
(b) That your expert shall be present;
(c) That whether the testing is according to the order may be
determined by your expert who shall have the right to terminate such examination until the court has had a hearing; and
(d) If the court finds the product impaired or destroyed by the
testing or examination, certain sanctions will be entered, such
as the use of the photographs, or other secondary evidence,
together with the right to inform the jury why such secondary
evidence is employed.
Assume there is an issue whether the defendant is the manufacturer.
Then the product involved is all important. The name of the defend36
ant on the product estops him from putting that in issue.
So also, by examination by an expert, the particular maker can be
identified. A wire rope, or metallurgical part is susceptible to identification by such means. Whenever the identity of the product-a
common and very serious issue-is a question, the importance of the
product itself is obvious.
STANDARDS

AND MANUALS

Standards are admissible today. It is immaterial whether they are
enacted by a governmental body or voluntary associations. They are
probative of the expected quality of the product. The admissibility of
standards had its origin in negligence cases.
In what is probably one of the leading cases on this question,3 7 a
negligence action, where a one-ton wire screen slipped because of an
error in the mating of the hoist cable and clamps, safety codes with
recommendations concerning the mating of cables and clamps were
received in evidence, together with expert testimony. The New Jersey
Supreme Court observed that the codes were admitted:
36. Bathory v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., 306 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1962);
Carney v. Sears, Roebuck, 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co.,
115 Conn. 249, 161 A. 120 (1932); Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Ill. App. 328,
8 N.E.2d 714 (1937); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 II. App. 2d 315,
229 N.E.2d 684, aff'd 42 Il1. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969); Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 570 0. App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936); Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393,
9 A.2d 572 (1939); Thornhill v. Carpenter-Norton Co., 250 Mass. 593, 108 N.E. 474
(1915); Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Miss. 253, 164 So. 231 (1935); Slavin v. Francis
H. Leggett & Co., 114 N.J. 421, 177 A. 120 (1935); Commissioners of State Ins. Fund
v. City Chem. Corp., 290 N.Y. 64, 48 N.E.2d 262 (1943); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
SECOND, § 400.
37. McComish v. De Soi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964).
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. . . as objective standards of safe construction, generally recog-

nized and accepted as such in the type of construction industry involved. A treatise is usually no more than one expert's opinion
regarding a particular factual complex. On the other hand, a
safety code ordinarily represents a consensus of opinion carrying
the approval of a significant segment of an industry. .

.

.

It is

offered in connection with expert testimony which identifies it as
illustrative evidence of safety practices or rules generally prevailing in the industry, and as such it provides support for the opinion
of the expert concerning the proper standard of care.
It is to be noted that the mating recommendations in the manuals
stemmed from both private and governmental sources, and the court
drew no distinction between them.
It is now well established that codes of various reputable safety corporations are admissible to show a defect. 38 Yet when a product is
defective when it fails to perform in the manner to be expected in the
light of its nature and intended function, there is a compulsive reason
for admissibility to show the norm of like products.
In Illinois, this question is no longer open to dispute after a recent
Supreme Court decision. In a railroad crossing case,3 9 a publication
of the Department of Public Works and Buildings setting standards
for grade crossing protection of public highways was properly admitted in evidence, notwithstanding that the Illinois Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over all phases of grade crossing regulation. The standards admitted prescribed when "cross buck signs"
are adequate, when flashing lights with gates are necessary, and when
grade separation is warranted.
In a subsequent Appellate Court opinion, also a railroad crossing
case,40 the Uniform Traffic Control Device Manual of Iowa, as well
as the Federal Uniform Traffic Control Device Manual, were received
in evidence to aid the jury in determining not only defendant's knowledge, but what was feasible. "Feasibility" is the term used in products actions to justify the admission of alternative methods, as well as
modifications in products litigation.
Manuals may be employed for any relevant matter. One California
case 4 describes the varied manuals which may be employed for vary38. Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969); Dorsey
v. Yoder, 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
39. Merchants National Bank of Aurora v. E.J. & E. Ry. Co., 49 Ill. 2d 118, 124,
273 N.E.2d 809, 812 (1971).
40. Adkins v. Chicago, R.I. & P. RR. Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 906, 274 N.E.2d 507
(1971).
41. Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968).
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hig propositions. Death and injuries occurred when the station wagon
tire blew out. The action was predicated on strict liability, warranty
and negligence. Here are some of the manuals, bulletins and publications employed:
(a) A "Tire Guide" recommending a certain size tire for use on
all Chevrolet station wagons, such as the one in question.
(b) A Chevrolet owner's manual, which made no reference concerning tire safety, but only recommended the pressure for ease in riding and tire life.
(c) A service bulletin issued by the tire manufacturer to its dealers showing recommended pressures for the tires, but making no reference about the maximum weight which could be safely borne.
(d) The maximum carrying capacity of the type of tire according
to the standards of the Tire and Rim Association.
(e) The engineering publications for the Chevrolet station wagon
indicating the maximum capacity of the rear wheels. (This, together
with the tire manufacturer's experts, showed the wagon to be overloaded when six normal weight people were riding in it.)
(f) Disregard of the standards of the Tire and Rim Association
by General Motors, which did not advise the purchasers of its vehicles
concerning overloading.
(g) Advertisements in Newsweek and Readers' Digest, which were
rerun in the Oakland Tribune six to ten times showing the tire comparable in strength to the one in question being driven over rocks and
boulders-an abuse labeled by defendant's expert as foolish.
These particular documents were employed to demonstrate the defectiveness of the product, as well as the failure to warn. Of course,
since there was a negligence issue, they were relevant on that charge.
This is an excellent example of the varying types of documents relevant in products litigation.
So also in the Yoder case, 42 an encyclopedic opinion of many important questions in the implementation of this doctrine, the maker's
instructions were admitted to prove lack of warning.
Yoder's instructions authorized the making of the duplicate stripper fingers but did not specify that they be made of hard maple
. . . In any event, nothing in the Yoder instruction booklet indicated that the stripper fingers served a safety purpose.
It may be said that manuals, instructions and other literature are relevant to show (a) lack of warning; (b) the character of the product;
42.

Dorsey v. Yoder, 331 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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(c) that plaintiff is within the scope of protected users, and any relevant issue in the cause. The instances in which such material may be
relevant is dependent upon the particular case.
OTHER OCCURRENCES-PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT

Similar occurrences have long been admissible in the law of torts.
In negligence actions, the purpose of such evidence, according to McCormick,4 " was to show:
(a) The existence of a particular condition, situation or defect;
(b) That plaintiff's injury was caused by the allegedly defective or
dangerous condition or situation;
(c) That the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known, of the dangerous or defective condition
or situation sued for.
This, of course, is ancient teaching in the law of torts.44 Such evidence is admitted in negligence cases for a limited purpose, and the
jury is so advised, not only at the time it is offered, but also in a specific instruction.4 5
Today, in products liability litigation, occurrences subsequent to the
happening of the particular event out of which the lawsuit arises are
admissible. Similar accidents are relevant both as to the character of
the product and causation. When the quality of the particular product
is in issue, is there any difference between prior and subsequent occurrences? It would seem not. So also, on the issue of causation, subsequent occurrences would be relevant. Consider drug cases. If others who used Aralen4 , for rheumatoid arthritis went blind, and others
who ingested MER 2917 for a heart condition developed cataracts
would not such evidence reflect on the causative factor?
In what is now a leading case, 48 the plaintiff was caught in an automatic door while leaving a hotel. An action against the hotel and the
designer of the door was unsuccessful. At the trial, evidence of prior
43. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 167, p. 351 (1972).
44. DeEugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 409 (3rd Cir. 1954); Evans v.
Pa. R. Co., 255 F.2d 205, 210 (3rd Cir. 1958); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d
79 (4th Cir. 1962); Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 302, 239 P.2d 48 (1951);
Wolczek v. Public Service Co., 342 Ill. 482, 500, 174 N.E. 577 (1931); Germann v.
Huston, 302 I11. App. 38, 43, 23 N.E.2d 371 (1939); Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co.,
318 Ill. App. 305, 363, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943); Vlahovich v. Betts Mach. Co., 101 I11.
App. 2d 123, 242 N.E.2d 17 (1968); Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239
N.C. 504, 80 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1954); Winefree v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 197
Tenn. App. 144, 83 S.W.2d 903 (1935).
45. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 II1. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 103, 46 III. 2d 288,
263 N.E2d 103 (1970).
46. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 368 aff'd 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.
1970); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish. 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
47. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
48. Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Neb. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970).
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accidents was admitted, while evidence of subsequent occurrences was
excluded. In reversing as to the manufacturer, the reviewing court
reasoned that subsequent occurrences were relevant to the issues of
causation and the defective condition.40
Proof of these similar happenings are often found in the company
records showing the occurrence and injury. They qualify as records
made in the ordinary course of business. And for certain conditions,
particularly those requiring the evidence of treating doctors, this may
be the only evidence. The more dramatic method of presentation is
the testimony of the other pzrsons involved. In a can explosion case,5"
three persons, who had experienced similar incidents in California,
New York and Wisconsin, testified by deposition. This was supplanted by compaiy records substantiating their testimony. And
Where a truck driver sustained an injured eye when a light bulb lens
shattered, it was error to exclude the evidence of other truck drivers
who had the. same experience. 51 Such evidence was irrefutable proof
of the character of the product.
FEASIBILITY AND SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATIONS

The policy in the law of negligence was to exclude evidence of subsequent changes. its reason was to encourage precautions without
subjecting tl+e maker to a possible admission of liability. 52 It soon
became questionable whether this ancient policy was consistent with
the object of the law of products liability. Without discussion, the old
policy was discarded.
The first inroad into this law of exclusion was the admission of
dvidence of the absence of safety devices in products actions predicated
on both negligence and strict liability.5 3 Another vehicle to the admission of alternative or different methods was "feasibility." Feasibil49. "Should the repair orders, prior or subsequent, tend to prove the faulty design
or minufacture of. any other necessary element of that cause of action, they would be
admissible." The court quoted Witkin's Calif. Evidence, Par. 353 (2d ed. 1966). "But a

subsequent accident at the same or similar place, under the same or similar conditions

is just as relevant as a prior accident to show that the condition was in fact dangerous
or defective, or thAt the injury was caused by the condition." Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel
Corp., cited supra.
50.. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ii. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636, aft'd 46 Ill. 2d
288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
51. Vlahovich v. Betts Machine Co., 101 Ill. App. 2d 123, 242 N.E.2d 17, alf'd 45
I11. 2d 501, 260 N.E.2d 230 (1970).
52. . Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 111.AIp. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956).
,53.. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970); Cdnifax v. Herc'ules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965); Wright v. Massey-Hdriris, Inc., 68 I11. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
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ity apparently means the effectiveness, practicalities and possibilities of
the other methods.
In a case predicated both on strict liability and negligence involving
the explosion of a can, evidence that the manufacturer subsequently
employed a type of capping which it had used prior to the occurrence
was properly admitted. Had this type of cap been on the can at the
fatal time, no explosion would have occurred. 4
In a printer-slotter machine case, with apparently negligence and
strict liability counts, a judgment was reversed solely on the trial court's
refusal to admit evidence that there were safety measures in use in the
industry on such products. The appellate court noted: (1) The
standard imposed upon a manufacturer is to keep informed of the
developments in his field, including safety devices and equipment; and
(2) the safety measures were evidence of what was feasible and what
measures were at the manufacturer's command to prevent such an
55
occurrence.
It may be categorically stated the old policies prohibiting post-occurrence changes have no pertinency in products liability cases. This is
manifest when the defectiveness may be demonstrated by alternative
feasible methods,56 or the employment of feasible safety devices.
What about the admissibility of modifications subsequent to the
injury? In a recent Illinois case,5 7 the reviewing court reversed the
judgment solely for excluding evidence of modifications after the
particular occurrence. The court reasoned that if other designs, as
well as safety devices on other products, could be admitted on the basis
of feasibility, "A post-occurrence change is equally relevant and
material in determining that a design alternative is feasible." It seems
54. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., et al., 116 Ill. App. 109, 253 N.E.2d 103, 46 Ill. 2d
288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
55. Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 739
(1968).
In a negligence action, Matteucci v. High School Dist. No. 208, 4 111. App.
3d 710, 281 N.E.2d 383, 389 (1972), the court commented at page 717: "This contention begs the question. Plaintiff's position is that if the convenient plastic guard,
so readily available, had been provided, plaintiff would have used it. In this regard,
we find that the testimony of availability of this guard was competent under the facts
and circumstances in the case at bar. Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill.
App. 2d 133, 146, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968)."
56. An excellent statement of the change of the law concerning alternative methods and the admissibility of modifications is found in Justice Stouder's opinion in Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
57. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749
(1972). Cited therein is Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205
(1969), where the plaintiff, injured when his hand slipped into the centralizer of an
earth boring drill, brought a products action. After the accident, plaintiff's employer
welded a guard on the centralizer. "This evidence was, of course, admissible to show
feasibility of guarding the centralizer, and the trial court instructed the jury that it
should be considered only for this purpose and not as evidence that the respondent or
retailer was negligent."
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then, that subsequent changes, like possible alternative methods of
design or potential safety devices, are admissible as demonstrating
the character of the product and, unlike prior occurrences in the law
of negligence, it is not received for a limited purpose.
COST OF PROTECTIVE DEVICE

Feasibility has become a watchword in evidence questions arising
during products litigation. It has been employed to justify admitting
measures available to make the product non-defective, as well as subsequent changes. Why not admit evidence of the cost of the safety
measures and perhaps the subsequent modifications, particularly if
these are minimal as compared with exposure? There must be considered the balancing of the likelihood of harm and the gravity of the
harm, if it happens, against precautions effective to avoid that harm.
The factors listed by Dean Wade are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3)
the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product
(including the effect of instructions or warnings), and (7) the
ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive. 58
This general principle of torts has been applied in a leading defective
design case. 59 In a district court opinion it was remarked:
On the other hand, a guard would not eliminate the machine's usefulness, nor would the cost of $200 to $500 on an $8,000 machine be unreasonable. 60
It would seem that in demonstrating the feasibility of safety devices or
modifications, the cost factor is highly relevant. Indeed, it goes to the
practicability of the employment of the safety measures or modifications.
EXPERT TESTIMONY

Probably the greatest transition in the law of expert testimony is rep58. Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
59. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 365, 467, P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970).
Evidence of the cost of the protective procedure as compared to the risk
involved is usually found in negligence cases. Hendricks v. Peabody Coal Co., 115 Ill.
App. 2d 35, 253 N.E.2d 56 (1969); Dallas v. Granite City Steel Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d
409, 211 N.E.2d 907 (1965).

60.

Dorsey v. Yoder, 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D.Pa. 1971).
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resented by the 1971 Illinois Supreme Court decision of Merchants
National Bank.6 ' In that railroad crossing case, the court permitted
an expert to express the opinion that the particular crossing "is very
inadequately protected." The court reasoned that "since the trier of
fact is not required to accept the opinion of the expert, such evidence
does not usurp the province of the jury." In its holding, the court
swept into discard a line of cases going as far back as 1873.62 The effects of this opinion are far-reaching. They extend into every phase
of litigation where an expert testifies. Now the expert may express an
opinion as to the ultimate issue in the case. The problem of proof is
considerably eased in products liability actions. For example, the expert who has examined the object will now be permitted to state: (a)
that he has an opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty, that the particular object is defective; and (b) most important,
the reasons for his opinion that the product is defective.
This is in accord with the new Federal Rules of Evidence providing:
"Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible
is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
'
by the trier of fact."62
a Apart from the ultimate issue of defectiveness,
it would seem opinions on the various definitions of defectiveness would
be proper. Thus, the expert could be asked whether there was a
failure of the product to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected of it, or whether it matched the average quality of like products,
63
or again, whether in his opinion the warning was adequate.
While the jury need not accept the witness' opinion, nonetheless,
this is a strong weapon in proving the defect by direct evidence. We
noted that in considering the value of the opinion expressed by the
expert, courts of review are impressed by his qualifications.6 4 If the
well qualified witness can make an impression upon appellate courts,
61.

Merchants National Bank v. E. J. Ry. Co., 49 Ill.2d 113, 273 N.E.2d 809

(1971).
62. Some of these are Chicago and Alton R. Co. v. Springfield & N.W.R. Co.,
67 111. 142 (1873), an action involving a cut under another railroad and the question
being how the work should be done; Keefe v. Armour & Co., 258 I11.
28, 107 N.E. 252

(1913), where the issue was whether the method to adopt a boiler was unsafe; Gil-

lette v. City of Chicago, 396 Ill. 619, 72 N.E.2d 326 (1946), involving the necessity of
shoring during the construction of a subway; Paisley v. American Zinc Co., 235 111. App.
22 (1924), concerning whether fumes caused property to depreciate, and Hughes v.
Wabash R. Co., 342 Ill. App. 159, 95 N.E.2d 735 (1951), where an expert witness

who stated a railroad crossing was extra-hazardous was cause for reversal.

62a. Rule 704 Fed. Rules of Evidence, 34 L. Ed. 2d, No. 5, p. 81.
63. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401
(1969).
64. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970); Merchants National Bank v. E.J. Ry. Co., 49 111. 2d 113, 237 N.E.2d 809

(1971).
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how much deeper do their qualifications cut with the trial judge
and jury? With direct evidence of a well qualified witness in the record, the trial court will be loath to exercise his powers under the Pedrick"5 doctrine either on motion for directed verdict or a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Another important development in the area of expert evidence i
the Darling case.6" It grants judicial permission to make liberal use
of professional treatises and books when cross-examining an expert
witness. Until 1965, Illinois followed the majority of jurisdictions in
holding that a treatise could not be referred to in cross-examination
unless the witness had based his opinion on it. Treatises may now
be recognized in Illinois for use in cross-examination, or the court
may take judicial notice of them. A disclaimer by the witness of
knowledge of the article does not prohibit its use. If the witness states
under questioning that he is not familiar with an authoritative work
in his field, it is certainty a reflection on his qualifications as an expert.
This is the same as Rule 529 of the Model Code of Evidence. This
rule dicates a preparatory phase. When the pre-trial depositions of
experts are taken, it might be advisable in certain cases to make inquiries first concerning the literature of their profession. Are they
familiar with it? Are there articles which support them, and if so,
what are they? Is there literature contrary to their position. Or it may
be possible to obtain this information through interrogatories. The
preparatory aspect is brought into focus in drug company litigation.
These companies collect all the literature on the side effects of their
products. One of the standard pre-trial requisites in such litigation
is the bibliography of the company. After getting it, examine carefully the various articles. No doubt they will be of value on the crossexamination of the company experts.
Obviously, the preparatory vistas opened by such a rule are numerous. You must do the necesssary preparation, if you intend to get the
benefit of the rule. As with any other tactic in a lawsuit, treatises
and documents should be used sparingly. Choose only one or two
works of acknowledged stature which flatly contradict the opposing
65. Pedrick v. Peoria & E.R. Co., 63 Ill. App. 117, 211
494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).
66. Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). Rule 703 of the New
provides: "The facts or data in the particular case upon

N.E.2d 134, a!['d 37 I11. 2d
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253,
Federal Rules of Evidence
which an expert bases an

opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence."
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position and support your client's position. Such publications may not
be evidence, but developments in the case may increase their importance and their impact on the jury.
While these articles are not substantive evidence, they may be of
untold aid. Consider, for example, an action against a commercial
blood bank, filed by a patient who had contracted serum hepatitis following a transfusion of blood furnished by the bank. There is, of
course, no possible way to determine whether transfused blood is virally infected, but it is common knowledge that some commercial blood
banks buy this human product from persons who are not in good
health. They may be alcoholics, drug addicts, or suffering from venereal diseases. The most articulate spokesman of those opposing such
businesses is probably Dr. J. Garrett Allen, professor of medicine at
Stanford University. In his many articles on the subject, he has
stated that the high incidence of hepatitis is a direct result of practices
followed by the blood banks-practices similar to those used by a
particular blood bank in a certain case. Indeed, he has very imposing statistics on the incidence of hepatitis in those furnished blood by
commercial as opposed to voluntary blood banks. Blood banks, he
points up, deal in a human product. The medical director of the defendant blood bank, a doctor, called as an adverse witness, admitted
knowledge of the articles, the status of Dr. Allen in the medical profession, but stated he simply disagreed with the statistics. He could
furnish none of his own, and knew of no others.
THE DECISION ON WHICH THEORY TO PROCEED

In many instances, the same facts will give rise to an action in strict
liability in tort, express warranty, negligence and even wilful and wanton conduct. Upon what theory or theories should the case be presented? If after pretrial discovery, it develops that the facts may be
successfully presented either on strict liability or negligence, one should
not pursue both theories. If there is a solid strict liability in tort action,
dismiss the negligence charge long before the trial commences. In
making this decision remember the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no
applicability to actions under this teaching."7 With only strict liability
in tort doctrine, the case has a completely different posture.
The defendant's due care, defendant's negligence, as well as that of
the plaintiff, have no place in the case. From the very outset, the attention of the jury is focused on the character of the product. The
67. McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968);
Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 403, 79 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1969).
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only defense left to the defendant, assuming that a prima facie case
has been presented, is that of assumption of risk-a difficult one at
best.
If one delays until the close of the plaintiff's case, or, worse yet,
until the close of all the evidence, to make the decision whether to
proceed solely on the strict liability doctrine or on strict liability and
negligence, he has tarried too long. Concepts of negligence have been
brought to the jury's attention. Defendant may have made an opening
statement outlining its due care and plaintiff's want of it. Worse yet,
plaintiff has been subject to a cross-examination about his conduct.
When this decision is not made until the close of all the evidence, the
jury has heard evidence of due care including its painstaking testing
and inspection methods and spot checks. Always remember to avoid
the position of having to erase from the jury's mind all evidence of
negligence and due care. It will not favorably react to a contention
that all such evidence is meaningless, and that the case rotates solely
around another issue.
There will no doubt be occasions when one desires to proceed on
both strict liability and negligence counts. These are usually situations
where the following circumstances play an important part:
(a) It is doubtful whether the doctrine of strict liability applies;
(b) There is no evidence of contributory negligence;
(c) Where the evidence of defendant's negligence is demonstrated
by its own records-the most conclusive proof of negligence but, unfortunately, not too frequently encountered;
(d) Where the conduct of the defendant is wilful and wanton as
to justify a claim for exemplary damages. This, of course, permits evidence of defendant's financial condition. This is undoubtedly a catalytic element.""
CONCLUSION

Strict liability in tort, although not of recent origin, brings into this
phase of the law a new concept, responsibility without negligence. To
implement this doctrine, new trial procedures, including rules of evidence, are requisite. These are as diversified as the doctrine itself.
This effort only attempts to touch upon some basic empirical standards.
68. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 312
(1968); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 646, aff'd 46 Ill. 2d

288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).

